The situation has posed serious problems not only for developed countries, but also for development and other primary producers, who are concerned about the negative effects of exchange rate fluctuations, related uncertainties and the surcharge on imports into the United States. Many were unsure of the exchange rate policy and sought advice from the Fund`s administration and staff. Schweitzer also feared that the vast majority of countries would have no chance of participating in a solution. Reactions to U.S. actions expressed by executive directors on August 16 illustrated the initial reactions of most monetary authorities. There was indeed an atmosphere of crisis. Many executive directors have pressed Mr. Dale for the intentions of the U.S. authorities, particularly with respect to the exchange rate situation, which would occur immediately, and the import surcharge. Some felt that there was an urgent need to negotiate new values in the coming days.
When the Executive Directors took up a draft decision that contained the Fund`s response to the U.S. communication, Dale said that U.S. authorities believed that U.S. measures were essential to create the dynamism of industrialized countries in the form of exchange rate and negotiation measures, which are essential to correct the imbalance in global payments. They therefore preferred that the Fund not make a decision at this stage. Mr. Viénot objected and was surprised that the Fund had only „taken notice“ in the draft decision of the actions taken by the United States; He preferred that the Fund express its opposition to the US action, which he said was „a clear deviance from the statutes“. The management of the Fund had been in informal contact with the US authorities during the first seven months of 1971, particularly after the first week of May, and knew that the position of the US authorities was very different from that of European officials. Moreover, as the speeches that were reported in the previous chapter show, the Us authorities had begun to present their views frankly.
They felt that the responsibility for correcting chronic imbalances in international payments – the U.S. deficit on the one hand, and the surpluses of several other industrialized countries on the other – should be shared. Specifically, they believed that the U.S. payment deficit led, at least in part, to the United States` for many years to bear a very large share of the defence costs of Western Europe, Japan and other militarily allied countries, and because the EEC and Japan trade agreements did not allow the liberal accession of the United States.